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This paper provides an additional channel through which inequal-
ity may inﬂuence growth, when labor migration is taken into account.
In fact, we show that human capital distribution is crucial to deter-
mine whether allowing migration of the most skilled workers from a
developing country may be beneﬁcial for growth, from the perspective
of the source economy. The net eﬀect linked to a brain drain is more
likely to be negative in the short run if human capital is very unequally
distributed. In addition, we ﬁnd that econometric analysis supports
our theoretical claims: the estimation of diﬀerent growth equations in
a cross-section of developing countries, based on a brand new dataset
on skilled migration (Docquier and Marfouk, 2004) shows that a brain
drain can have a positive impact only when it is associated with low
inequality (in income or schooling).
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11 Introduction
By ”brain drain” we mean the migration of (part of) the most skilled workers
in a population, from less developed countries to more developed and richer
ones1.
The relevance of high-skilled migration in the real world is undoubtable
and growing (for an empirical assessment, see Carrington and Detragiache,
1998, as well as Docquier and Marfouk, 2004); to some extent, it concerns
not only LDC’s, but also industrialized countries.
Since Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), development economists have wor-
ried about the possible eﬀects that this ”human capital ﬂight” could exert on
welfare and growth in the source economy (and on convergence/divergence
with respect to the destination country). The recognition of human capital
formation as a crucial engine of growth, in a consistent strand of literature
inspired by Lucas (1988), has even added new interest and life to the debate.
All along the 90’s, there has been a ﬂourishing of endogenous growth mod-
els all assessing the negative eﬀects of brain drain on growth: in particular we
refer to Miyagiwa (1991), Haque and Kim (1995), Reichlin and Rustichini
(1999) and Wong and Yip (1999). All these contributions share the view
that the migration of the most skilled individuals, through a decrease in the
average human capital (and the consequently negative externality eﬀects),
would be bad for growth and imply diverging growth trajectories between
rich and poor countries.
More recently, some models have been published arguing that a brain
drain might even be good for growth and welfare in the developing economy.
In fact Mountford (1997), Beine et al. (2001), Stark and Wang (2002) put
forward the idea that a positive chance of migration may foster human capital
accumulation in the source country, since it entrains an incentive eﬀect linked
to the higher wages available abroad. In this framework, people may choose
1This one is a ”broad” deﬁnition. A ”narrow” deﬁnition of the brain drain would refer
to the migration of scientists, engineers, faculty members ..., rather than to the outﬂow of
educated people in general.
2to educate more in order to become eligible for migration, and then to have
access to the higher returns of the foreign labor market. The gains in total
human capital formation produced by this incentive eﬀects may outweigh,
in the end, the human capital loss represented by the actual brain drain.
However, even in this context, the ”unpleasant” result of divergence holds.
In the present paper we consider this incentive argument, and explore its
consequences in term of growth, when inequality is concerned. To be more
precise, we want to see if inequality aﬀects the interplay between skilled
migration and growth. We try to accomplish this task, by adopting an OLG
setup in the fashion of Azariadis and Drazen’s (1990) analysis of the trade-oﬀ
between studying and working.
By doing this, we will be able to show that human capital distribution
is crucial to determine whether the brain gain would be strong enough to
prevail over the brain drain2 (at least in early periods). We will also show
how allowing migration modiﬁes human capital distribution in the long run,
and that in the long run even the (possible) net brain gain experienced at
the beginning, is outweighed by the persisting brain drain.
Our model contributes to the literature on high-skilled migration and
growth, ﬁlling the interesting space which lies between Beine et al. (2001)
and Mountford (1997). In fact, the ﬁrst paper assumes inequality (of innate
learning abilities) as renewing itself randomly in every period, and in the
end does not care too much about the dynamics of human capital distribu-
tion, while we think that in developing economies the inequality of chances
(and its persistence over time) matters a lot. On the other side Mountford
(1997), who concentrates on the ”long run” of income distribution in its
analysis of the relation between brain drain and growth, cares more about
the consequences on inequality, than about the consequences of inequality.
In addition, our analysis oﬀers a contribution to the literature on the rela-
tionship between inequality and growth. In fact, we retrieve an additional
channel through which inequality (of abilities, income, education ...) may af-
2We borrow these terms of ”brain drain” vs ”brain gain” from Stark et al. (1997).
3fect economic growth. Of course this channel works, in developing economies,
only when labor is (at least partially) internationally mobile. And it has to
be underlined that, similarly to other papers (see for instance de la Croix and
Doepke, 2003), in our model the growth-inequality link runs through human
capital and education.
Moreover, we are able to provide some empirical evidence in support of
our theoretical claims. To this scope we exploit both the well-known brain
drain data provided by Carrington and Detragiache (1998) for selected de-
veloping countries, and a brand-new data set built by Docquier and Marfouk
(2004) that revise the previous one and adds industrialized countries to the
sample. Estimating growth equations (enhanced with terms that account for
inequality and high-skilled migration) in a cross-section of developing coun-
tries, we ﬁnd that a brain drain can positively aﬀect income growth only if
schooling and/or income are not too unequally distributed across classes.
The paper is thus organized as follows. Section 2 presents the simple
model upon which our analysis is built. Migration is explicitly introduced
in Section 3, which then analyzes consequences in terms of growth and in-
equality. Section 4 is devoted to the presentation of our econometric ﬁndings.
Finally, Section 5 provides a short concluding discussion.
2 The model
Our model is inspired, as pointed out before, by Azariadis and Drazen (1990),
who develop a framework of analysis to study the trade-oﬀ between studying
and working.
The source economy (developing country) is populated by overlapping
generations of utility maximizing individuals, who live for two periods and
are heterogeneous only with respect to their parental human capital, which
is distributed according to the density function f(ht) over the interval (h,h).
In the ﬁrst period of their life, agents can devote a fraction τt of their
time to education, building up human capital for the next period; in the
4remainder of the time (1 − τt), they can earn a wage wt from their part of
inherited human capital.











where σ, γ and δ should all belong to the open interval (0,1).
Agents maximize life-time income evaluated at time t, i.e.:










where wt+1 is the wage at time t + 1, and Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1 accounts for the
interest rate3.
It’s worth noting that, by writing (3), we implicitly assume that the
”inherited” part of human capital (the one that can provide wages in the
ﬁrst period) does not generate income in the second period; we may think to
this part of human capital as ”physical strength” or ”manual skills”, which
are likely to decay more rapidly than ”intellectual skills” (acquired through
schooling and education in general). In other words, schooling not only






























It can be easily seen that
∂τ∗
t
∂ht > 0, if γ > δ.
3We may even assume that wt+1 = wt = w, in such a way that no wage dynamics have
to be modelled; alternatively one may introduce exogenous dynamics.
5This means that the demanded (or better: ”desired”) amount of school-
ing τ∗
t will be increasing in ht, if (and only if) human capital ”matters more”
in the educational process than it does in the inheritance process. This hy-
pothesis may be justiﬁed by claiming that the cultural environment matters
more than genetics, in the transmission of skills and knowledge. In fact, it
does not seem too unrealistic to say that the human capital of the parent has
a relevant importance in determining the school performance of the children
and their ability to take proﬁt from their studies.
It it easy to check that ∂2τ∗
t /∂h2
t < 0, in the case of γ > δ. The function
τ∗
t (ht) is thus upward sloping and concave. Not surprisingly, the desired
amount of schooling also turns out to depend positively on the expected
wage dynamics wt+1/wt, and negatively on the discount rate Rt+1.
At this stage we introduce an assumption which is useful to simplify the
further developments of the model, without causing any signiﬁcant loss of
realism. In fact we assume that, although demanded continuously by the
agents, education is oﬀered as a discrete variable (let’s say by the national
education system). We simply think to diﬀerent ”packages” of schooling
years, that in the real world could correspond for example to primary school,
secondary school, high school, university, post-graduate studies, and so on.
For ease of representation, we start by considering the discrete supply of
education as assuming three distinct discrete values, namely: τ1 < τ2 < τ3.
To know how educational choices are eﬀectively made (and by whom), we
simply need to compare the values that the function Ωt(ht,τt) assumes for
τ = τ1, for τ = τ2, and ﬁnally for τ = τ3. Then, according to which one
of the three functions Ωt(ht,τ1), Ωt(ht,τ2), or Ωt(ht,τ3) attains the highest
level, people will chose the underlying value of τt.
We claim what follows:
Proposition 1 Given τ1, τ2 and τ3, such that
σ
1










then there exist threshold values h1,2 , h2,3 and h1,3 such that:
6• for h < h < h1,2 ⇒ Ω(τ1) > Ω(τ2) > Ω(τ3)
• for h1,2 < h < h1,3 ⇒ Ω(τ2) > Ω(τ1) > Ω(τ3)
• for h1,3 < h < h2,3 ⇒ Ω(τ2) > Ω(τ3) > Ω(τ1)
• for h2,3 < h < h ⇒ Ω(τ3) > Ω(τ2) > Ω(τ1) .
(The Proof is given in Appendix A.)
Assuming, as required by the condition stated above, that τ1 > 0 (so that
the case of ”no schooling” is excluded, and even the least endowed spend
some time in formal education), things are as explained in Fig.1: people
with parental human capital such that h < hi < h1,2 will have the lowest
education; agents characterized by h1,2 < hi < h2,3 will educate at the inter-
mediate level τ2; and the segment with h2,3 < hi < h will buy the highest
possible amount of schooling τ3.
Figure 1: Evaluating life-time incomes: the choice of educational levels
Reintroducing time in our notation, and given these choices, we can rep-
resent in Fig. 2 the relationship ht+1 = G(ht) as a discontinuous function,
which in fact results from the diﬀerent values of τ∗
t,i(ht,i).
All the eventual crossings between G(ht) and the 45◦ line represent dif-
ferent (and all stable) educational steady-states. As time goes to inﬁnity,
7Figure 2: Educational steady states
people tend to converge toward multiple ﬁxed levels of human capital. Dif-
ferent cases may arise. For instance, it may happen that there is only one
crossing, at the highest level. In such a case, in the very long run, inequality
disappears, and all individuals converge to the same level of human capi-
tal, determined by the highest degree of education4. On the opposite side,
nothing excludes that everyone converges to a lower educational steady-state.
Another qualiﬁcation is now in order: when considering the function
ht+1 = G(ht) we need to introduce a further assumption in order to pre-
vent eventual (future) values of ht+i from falling below h (thus redeﬁning,










it is derived from h < aτσ
t h
γ, which requires h to be lower than the lowest
(stable) steady-state value of ht.
We can now summarize the condition for all our dynamic model to be
”well behaved” as being simply:
4It has to be said that our model allows for social ”convergence”, but does not encom-




























that indeed does not turn out to be a heavy restriction5.
Until now we have described the behavior of the source economy in ”au-
tarky”. Let’s now see how the picture changes once we allow for migration.
3 Migration
3.1 Introducing migration
First of all, let’s make clear that in our framework international migration
(or better: the will to migrate) is motivated only by the fact that the foreign
country can oﬀer, for whatever exogenous reason6, a unit wage wF > wH to
the prospective immigrant7.
We model a brain drain as follows: migration arises as the interaction of
the agents’ will to migrate with two factors (policies). The immigration policy
of the destination country consists in a minimal educational requirement   τ,
that the prospective immigrant needs to meet if she wants to be accepted. On
the other side, the emigration policy ﬁxed by the source country is entirely
described by the parameter m, i.e. the fraction of individuals allowed to
migrate, among the ones with τi ≥   τ. This parameter m thus becomes
simply the probability to migrate, from the point of view of ”home” workers.



















5Numerical examples are available upon request.
6It is quite natural to put forward technological reasons; on this subject see for instance
Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2001).
7The value of wF may be implicitly discounted (thus, lower than its ”real” value) to
take into account that workers normally prefer, other things being equal, to live in their
birth country.
9so that the resulting function τM
t (ht) is simply an ”expansion” of τ∗
t (ht).
In this case of ”general” migration, which is indeed quite unrealistic, the
incentive eﬀect causes both an increase of the enrollment in highest educa-
tion and a decrease in the number of people who will choose the minimal
education.
3.2 Consequences of a brain drain on education choices
and human capital distribution in the long run
In the more interesting case of a brain drain (which is modeled setting   τ = τ3
and represented in Fig. 3) the incentive works only for the highest stage of
education: the curve Ω(τ3) is the only one to shift upwards. Opening frontiers
moves the threshold value h2,3 to the left: hM
2,3 < hA
2,3; this means that the
marginal individual (who is indiﬀerent between τ2 and τ3 ≡   τ) will now be
an agent with a lower level of parental human capital. The higher return
for superior education (wt+1 + m(wF
t+1 − wt+1) > wt+1) induces more people
(let’s say from the middle class) to educate at the highest level.
Figure 3: The educational incentive of a brain drain
A ﬁrst consequence of this incentive eﬀect can be seen in Fig. 4a, that
shows how this shift to the left of the marginal individual may make attain-
able a high educational steady state.
10Figure 4: Long run consequences of a brain drain on human capital distri-
bution
Of course, it may also cause an intermediate steady-state to disappear
(Fig.4b); if this is the case, the brain drain will turn out to be inequality-
worsening, in fact (what we may call) a middle class will disappear, and
the higher class, after being initially enlarged by the incentive eﬀect, will
progressively shrink by eﬀect of repeated migration outﬂows.
But what happens in terms of growth?
113.3 Growth eﬀects of a brain drain
Since we assume total output to be given by:
Yt = AtHt (7)
the growth rate of the economy, keeping At constant, will be given by the





Assuming that frontiers are opened starting from time t+1, and that all
the agents correctly anticipate this policy at period t, the possible merits of
migration can be simply assessed by evaluating gM
t (M for ”migration”), and
eventally comparing it with gA
t (A stands for ”autarky”).
The growth rate gM
t will turn out to depend crucially on f(ht), the density
function of human capital over the interval (h,h), that means on inequality.









Let’s now consider our simple ”discrete” setting with three educational
























































8To take into account the fact that young individuals work when they do not study, we
could have written something like gt = f(  ht+1
  ht
)
12When compared with gA
t , the formulation for gM
t in (11) displays some
key diﬀerences. First, it takes into account the fact that the ”threshold
individual” moves from hA
2,3 to the lower level hM
2,3, by eﬀect of the stronger
incentive linked to the migration opportunity. Second, it considers that, after
actual migration, only a fraction (1−m) of the most educated remains in the
home country. Third, it averages the post-migration human capital over a
mass which falls short from 1 by the quantity m 
  ht
hM
2,3 f(ht), which represents
the proportion of actual migrants in the total population.
Then it is clear how f(ht) can play a decisive role. In particular, the
more people is endowed with a human capital comprised between the two
values hM
2,3 and hA
2,3, the more ample will be the possible gain from migration
(provided that the actual number of successful migrants is not too large). It’a
also worth noting that, for each f(ht), there will exist a value of m which
maximizes gM
t




2,3 f(ht)dht = 0 (that means that nobody
will be touched by the incentive), the optimal value for m will be zero.
Another speciﬁcation is in order: while a raise in m will extend highest
education to agents with less and less human capital, the m migrants will be
selected randomly (in the luckiest case10) among the prospective migrants.
This implies that, ceteris paribus, there is a negative ”composition” eﬀect of
migration.
The general conclusion we can draw is that allowing a (limited) brain
drain may be growth enhancing, at least in a short run perspective, if there
is a numerous enough middle class which could be interested in higher edu-
cation; while it is likely to be harmful if human capital is extremely unevenly
distributed11 so that, at the limit, nobody is motivated to shift to a higher
9The determination of the optimal value to choose for m is a central issue in Beine et
al. (2001) and in Stark and Wang (2002), but both these papers do not deal with the
problem of inequality.
10In fact, the successful migrants could be selected as the best m among all the eligible,
and not randomly.
11All over the paper, we have related the notion of inequality to the existence (and the
size) of a middle class. However, we need to underline that, in general terms, keeping ﬁxed
13educational level.
These ﬁndings allow us to establish a link with the literature on the re-
lationship between inequality and growth12. In fact, we have shown that,
when (skilled) labor is (at least partially) internationally mobile, an addi-
tional channel through which inequality may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence growth is
turned on, in developing economies. Since in many LDC’s the size of skilled
migration is important and growing, and since increasing globalization calls
for frontiers to be more and more open, we believe that this channel is not
negligible.
It may be worth saying that most of the available literature on inequality
and growth identiﬁes the accumulation of physical capital as the key fac-
tor through which this relationship runs. In our setting inequality aﬀects
growth through migration and education. This makes this paper closer to
the strand of literature which focuses on the accumulation of human capital,
when looking for a mechanism through which inequality may aﬀect growth;
an example in this direction is represented by de la Croix and Doepke (2003,
2004), who link inequality and growth through human capital accumulation
and diﬀerential fertility.
3.4 The simple case of a uniform distribution
Here we want to show, by means of a very simple example, how we can
evaluate and compare the diﬀerent eﬀects of a positive migration chance,
when diﬀerently egalitarian distributions of parental human capital are going
to be considered.
In particular, we turn our view to the class of uniform distributions that
have the same mean   h, but are deﬁned on diﬀerent intervals. In this case,
the width L of the interval of deﬁnition fully characterizes the distribution,
the density function being 1/L and the extremes respectively   h − L/2 and
  h + L/2. Therefore, since var(L) = L2/12, it is clear that the smaller is L
the size of the middle class, inequality may nonetheless vary.
12See Benabou (1996) for a comprehensive discussion.
14the more equally parental human capital is distributed, according to what
we meant in the previous section.
For sake of simplicity and ease of computations, in the remainder of this
Section we will consider two educational levels instead of three. The quality
and the interpretation of the results we will obtain are unaﬀected by this
change.
3.4.1 Analytical results
Suppose that, at time t, a developing country opens its frontiers, or that it
experiences some shift in m (increased mobility of high skilled workers). We
are ﬁrst interested in establishing the sign of ∂(gM
t )/∂L.
In other words we are trying to understand how the possible gains from
allowing (more) migration depend on human capital distribution (that in this
example is entirely described, as we were saying, by the parameter L).
We claim what follows:




(The Proof is given in Appendix B.)
The result is clear-cut: if frontiers are opened and skilled migration is
likely to occur, then more inequality will mean less growth.
In addition, we can prove that:
Proposition 3 Under appropriate values of the parameters, there exists a
strictly positive m∗ = argmax(gM
t ) .
(The Proof is given in Appendix C.)
That means that, if frontiers are opened, there may exist a strictly positive
value of the migration rate which maximizes growth. The fact that this
m∗ can be possibly diﬀerent from 0 means that we can identify conditions
(depending on inequality, see the Appendix) for a brain drain to be beneﬁcial;
in other words, we can rule out the possibility that a brain drain is necessarily
growth-worsening.
153.4.2 A numerical example
Here we build a numerical example (i.e. we ﬁx the parameter values and
solve our model), in order to provide some results that cannot be proved
analytically.
In particular we want to show that, once we deﬁne:
- ∆g ≡ gM
t − gA
t
- m∗ as being that value of m which maximizes the possible gains from
migration (m∗ = argmax(∆g)), and
- m◦ as the highest possible value for which opening frontiers do not provoke
a loss (∆g(m◦) = 0, with m◦  = 0),
then the following results hold:
(i) ∂m∗
∂L < 0, and
(ii) ∂m◦
∂L < 0.
The meaning of this double result is easy to explain. A more egalitarian
country would be able to tolerate relatively higher values of m, without
experiencing any growth losses (result (ii)). In addition, a more egalitarian
human capital distribution would push a developing country to optimally
choose a relatively larger value of m∗, when m is under its policy control
(result (i)).
Before choosing a particular conﬁguration of the parameters, we make
explicit a requirement we ask them to meet, namely that there will be always
(i.e. with or without migration) someone who chose to educate at the higher
level and someone who opt for lower education. This requirement, that is
made only for sake of realism and that is not necessary for our results to
hold, translates into:   h − L/2 < hM
1,2 < hA
1,2 <   h + L/2.






















log(  h + L
2)
.
Once we take into account the above restriction, we can compose the list
16L 7.4 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8
m∗ 0.275 0.251 0.233 0.219 0.207 0.197 0.187 0.179
m◦ 0.995 0.903 0.825 0.757 0.698 0.647 0.602 0.561
Table 1: Simulation results
of the parameter values as follows: τ1 = 0.45, τ2 = 1.9 τ1, wt = 1, wt+1 = 1.7,
wF
t+1 = 2.1, Rt+1 = 1.6, a = 1.1, δ = 0.35, σ = 0.3, γ = 0.7 and   h = 4.4.
The output of this simulation is reported in Table 1 and relates the com-
puted values of m∗ and m◦ to the diﬀerent, exogenously ﬁxed, values of L. It
can be seen that what was claimed above is reproduced by our simulation. A
graphic representation is provided in Figure 5, where fX is associated with
a smaller L (when compared to fY).
Figure 5: Growth-maximizing brain drain with alternative human capital
distributions
Let us also underline that changing the values of the parameters inside
the admissible range deﬁned in Sections 2 and 3 would not aﬀect the quality
of the results13.
To conclude, it’s maybe worth saying that we are able to reproduce the
same kind of results if, instead of uniform distributions, we work with expo-
nential distributions belonging to the class described by the density function
13Some sensitivity analysis is available upon request.
17f(h) = λe−λh, where if λ > 0 increases, inequality decreases14. In particular
we get that ∂m∗
∂λ > 0.
3.5 What about long-run growth?
A peculiar feature of this kind of model is that, keeping m positive but ﬁxed
from time t+1 on, the ”threshold” individual would not move further. How-
ever, if we compare this situation with the status quo (closed frontiers), we
see that the motivation to educate more remains in place, and all the ”post-
opening” generations will educate more because of this policy change. But in
every period, there will be a constant loss of a fraction m of workers from the
most educated class, without any other addition to this class (provided that
divergence holds, keeping alive the attractiveness of getting a job abroad).
At the limit, for t → ∞, there will be strictly no one to hold the highest
degree of study in the developing economy. Along time, the net eﬀect of
these two forces on the growth rate is ambiguous, as it was in the case of
period 1. What is sure is that, going toward inﬁnity and by eﬀect of suc-
cessive migration waves, the higher educational steady state will be attained
by a negligible share of the population, and the whole economy will register
an average level of human capital lower than the level it would have reached
keeping its frontiers closed. So, if the long-run of such a model is of some
interest, we can say that a brain drain will be unambiguously harmful for
long-run income, and it will be inequality increasing all along the transition
path.
But, as we have already pointed out, the relevance and the interest of
the long-run in an OLG model with migration policies remain somewhat
questionable. However, it could be interesting to study how a government
could play ”optimally” with m along time.
To some extent, it would also be attractive to consider m as exogenously
growing, as a consequence of the increasing globalization of the world econ-
14With this exponential form also the mean depends on λ. More precisely we have that
µ = 1
λ and σ2 = ( 1
λ)2
18omy. In this case, our short-run results would continuously replicate over
time15.
It may also be interesting to underline that, in our model, the emigra-
tion policy parameter m is not the only policy instrument available for the
developing economy. In fact, also educational policies (the conﬁguration of
τ’s oﬀered by the state to its citizens) matter to the growth perspectives of
the country, and can be used in combination with migration policies.
4 Empirical evidence
Here we want to present some evidence that econometric analysis do not
reject the predictions suggested by our model. To sum up, the theoretical
part of our paper argued that ceteris paribus a brain drain can be good for
growth if there exists a large enough ”middle class” which can beneﬁt from
the educational incentive derived from an increased migration probability.
To test this hypothesis we proceed to cross-country estimations of the
following equation:
ygr = α0+α1 
I
Y
+α2 log(y0)+α3 dumAFR+α4 BD+α5 (BD MID), (12)
where ygr is the annual average growth rate of GDP per capita, I/Y is
the average ratio of investment to GDP, log(y0) is the logarithm of initial
GDP per capita (this term accounts for convergence eﬀects: we expect α2 to
be negative), dumAFR is a dummy variable for sub-Saharian Africa, BD is
the brain drain, and MID is the ’middle class’ size variable.
As it will be extensively explained later on, we will take diﬀerent possible
measures of MID. Moreover BD, which is deﬁned as the migration rate of
15This scenario of progressive globalization, that implies an anticipated and perma-
nent(ly increasing) trajectory for m, can be contrasted with the opposite case of a revolu-
tion (like the Khomeinist coup in Iran), which involves a non-anticipated and temporary
shift of m. In the latter situation the incentive eﬀect does not exsist, and there isn’t any
brain gain to compensate for the brain drain.
19people with tertiary education or more, can be measured either with reference
to the U.S. or to the whole OECD area. In any case, it is important to
underline that the predictions of our model require α5 to be positive. Roughly
speaking, it means that a brain drain can exert a positive eﬀect on growth
when it is associated with a large enough middle class (a high MID); in
general it can be said that we look for non-linearities in the relation between
brain drain and growth.
4.1 Data
4.1.1 Brain drain
Doing empirical work on the economics of migration has usually undergone
severe limitations due to the lack of extensive and reliable datasets on this
issue. However, the data provided by Carrington and Detragiache (1998) for
a sample of developing countries can be used for statistical inference, once we
combine them with well known data on educational attainment and income
inequality.
It has to be said that these data (CD henceforth) have been for several
years the unique reference for the empirical literature on the brain drain.
However, their reliability is not unquestioned: in fact the CD estimates of
the emigration rates are obtained starting from three main statistical sources
(US Census data on the skill composition of immigration, OECD data on mi-
gration inﬂows by sending country, and the Barro-Lee data on educational
attainment in source countries), but relying for the rest on quite strong as-
sumptions16.
That’s why Docquier and Marfouk (2004) have built a new database (DM
throughout the rest of the paper) on the brain drain, that aims to improve
over CD in two respects. First, they integrate data on the skill distribution
of immigrants for the vast majority of the OECD countries, reﬁning the
16Like, for example, that the skill structure of US immigration applies also to the other
receiving countries.
20quality of the estimates. Second, they expand the dimension of the sample
providing data about developing countries that were not covered in CD, but
also supplying estimates about the North-North skilled migration. To have
an idea, the CD dataset conveys reliable data on the brain drain evaluated
at the year 1990 for a maximum of 52 developing countries17, while the
DM dataset, for the same year, contains complete information about 170
countries.
For purposes of comparison, we report in Table 2 both CD and MD data
on brain drain estimates and general migration rates, for all those countries
covered by Carrington and Detragiache (1998). The diﬀerences between the
two studies are not negligible. As Docquier and Marfouk (2004) explain in
details, the CD data led to a general underestimation of high-skilled migra-
tion outﬂows from developing countries 18.
Our strategy is to exploit both data sets to perform our estimations. We
will proceed in three stages. First, we will work with brain drain estimates
coming from CD. Then, we will use data from DM for the same countries
covered by CD. Finally we will employ all the data in DM, thus introducing
also the North-North brain drain.
4.1.2 Other variables
To account for equality and/or middle class size (MID) we rely on six diﬀer-
ent measures. The ﬁrst four are taken from a popular dataset built by Barro
and Lee (2000); MIDT is computed as the ratio between the percentage of
the population (aged over 25) that has been enrolled at most in secondary
school and the sum of the percentages that have been enrolled at most in
17Since CD is organized on data about U.S. immigrants, we decided to keep only those
countries for which U.S. emigrants are more than 30%.
18With some notable exceptions for countries like Algeria, Morocco or Turkey whose
emigration is massively directed to non-US countries like France or Germany, and for
which the brain drain was overestimated because of the erroneous assumption of identical
skill distribution of immigrants (with respect to the US). However, data on these countries
were considered as being non-reliable according to the 30% criterion we adopted, and then
do not appear in Table 1.
21Carrington and Detragiache (1998) Docquier and Marfouk (2004)
Country BDO BDUS MR0 MRUS US/OECD migr. BD MR reliability rate
Argentina 2.7 1.9 0.6 0.4 72.3 3.3 0.9 94.8
Benin 0.4 0.4 na na 100.0 6.1 0.2 91.5
Bolivia 4.2 4.2 0.7 0.7 100.0 5.9 1.0 95.4
Brazil 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.1 44.0 1.7 0.3 62.5
Cameroon 3.2 3.2 na na 100.0 15.2 0.4 93.6
Central African Republic 1.7 1.7 na na 100.0 4.4 0.2 96.8
Chile 6.0 3.3 1.1 0.6 54.3 6.3 1.7 82.5
China 3.0 1.4 0.1 na 51.5 3.1 0.2 79.4
Colombia 5.8 5.6 1.1 1.1 96.9 9.2 1.8 97.0
Costa Rica 7.1 7 2.4 2.4 100.0 7.7 2.6 99.0
Dominican Republic 14.7 14.2 6.5 6.3 96.7 17.9 7.9 97.5
Ecuador 3.8 3.8 1.9 1.9 100.0 5.4 2.7 98.0
Egypt 5.0 2.5 0.5 0.3 50.6 5.3 0.7 86.4
El Salvador 26.1 26.1 11.3 11.4 100.0 32.9 14.4 99.3
Fiji 21.3 21.3 3.6 3.6 100.0 63.6 15.5 99.9
Gambia 61.4 59.1 0.2 0.2 100.0 76.0 1.3 81.4
Ghana 25.7 15.1 0.4 0.2 53.3 33.7 1.2 76.4
Guatemala 13.5 13.5 3.4 3.4 100.0 18.2 4.3 99.7
Guyana 77.5 77.3 14.5 14.5 100.0 89.2 28.0 98.8
Honduras 15.7 15.7 3.0 3.0 100.0 21.1 4.0 99.6
India 2.6 1.1 0.2 na 44.1 2.6 0.2 96.6
Indonesia 1.5 1.4 na na 90.5 6.2 0.3 35.3
Jamaica 77.4 67.3 20.3 13.4 61.0 84.1 25.6 99.8
Kenya 10.0 9.9 0.1 0.1 100.0 26.9 0.5 96.6
Lesotho 2.9 2.9 na na 100.0 6.2 0.1 92.5
Malawi 2.0 2.0 na na 100.0 7.5 0.1 95.7
Mali 0.9 0.9 na na 100.0 6.6 0.7 99.2
Mauritius 7.2 7.2 0.2 0.2 100.0 37.2 5.3 91.2
Mexico 10.3 10.3 7.7 7.7 100.0 10.4 7.4 99.9
Mozambique 8.6 8.6 na na 100.0 18.2 0.8 99.3
Nicaragua 18.8 18.7 4.7 4.7 100.0 29.0 7.7 99.7
Pakistan 6.7 2.4 0.3 na 35.2 6.1 0.4 85.9
Panama 19.6 19.5 6.7 6.7 100.0 21.7 7.7 99.6
Papua New Guinea 2.2 2.2 na na 100.0 35.2 0.8 99.4
Paraguay 2.0 1.9 0.2 0.2 100.0 3.2 0.6 96.8
Peru 3.4 3.0 1.0 0.9 87.1 5.6 1.6 85.3
Philippines 9.0 6.6 3.1 2.2 71.6 12.8 4.1 91.9
Rwanda 2.2 2.2 na na 100.0 9.4 0.1 87.7
Sierra Leone 24.3 24.1 0.3 0.3 100.0 31.0 0.5 94.1
South Korea 14.9 5.7 4.2 1.6 36.0 20.2 4.8 40.0
Sudan 1.8 1.7 na na 100.0 5.0 0.1 86.4
Syria 3.1 3.1 0.7 0.7 100.0 6.9 1.7 90.2
Thailand 1.5 1.2 0.2 0.2 87.6 2.4 0.4 86.5
Togo 1.3 1.3 na na 100.0 8.9 0.5 90.3
Trinidad & Tobago 57.8 57.2 9.5 9.4 100.0 77.2 18.9 99.7
Uganda 15.5 15.4 0.1 0.1 100.0 29.9 0.4 95.6
Uruguay 3.8 3.7 1.1 1.1 100.0 6.1 1.9 96.3
Venezuela 2.1 1.6 0.4 0.3 77.4 3.9 0.8 96.9
Zambia 5.0 5.0 0.1 na 100.0 12.2 0.2 92.5
Zimbabwe 4.7 4.6 0.1 0.1 100.0 5.1 0.5 97.3
South Africa 7.9 2.6 0.4 0.1 32.4 7.2 0.5 96.2
Sources: Carrington and Detragiache (1998), Docquier and Marfouk (2004).
Notes: all data are in % and refer to 1990; by ’brain drain’ we mean the migration rate of people with at least tertiary
education.
Deﬁnitions of variables:
- BDO, BD: brain drain to OECD countries
- BDUS: brain drain to the U.S.
- MRO, MR: total migration rate to OECD countries
- MRUS: total migration rate to the U.S.
Table 2: The size of the brain drain: comparing data on migration from
selected developing countries.
22either ﬁrst or post-secondary; MIDC is obtained in the same way, but look-
ing at completed educational levels instead of simple enrollment; MIDdumT
and MIDdumC are dummy variables derived from MIDT and MIDC (they
are given a value equal to 1 when the base variable is larger than 0.35 and
0.45 respectively, and 0 otherwise). These four measures focus on schooling
inequality, and we think that they are very appropriate to capture the size of
that middle class which could react to eventual educational incentive derived
from migration. The last two measures focus on income inequality and are
taken from Deininger and Squire’s (1996) data set; MIDUMQ is a dummy
variables which assumes value 1 if the sum of the income shares of third and
fourth quintiles exceeds 0.34; MIDUMG is a dummy variable as well, which
takes value 1 if the Gini coeﬃcient in income distribution is lower than 45.
Obviously, for all these variables we take 1990 values.
Data on income variables (ygr and I/Y ) come from the Penn World
Tables version 6.1 (updated October 2002)19, and are averaged on a yearly
base over the period 1990-2000; initial GDP per capita (y0) is obviously that
of 1990.
4.2 Econometric results
Since we are employing two alternative data sets for the brain drain estimates,
we start by showing in Table 3 the correlation matrix of the diﬀerent measures
of both high-skilled and general migration. What we are mostly interested
in is the couple of variables that will enter the equation we want to estimate:
BDO (from CD) and BD (from DM). Despite the notable diﬀerences in
Table 1, their correlation is indeed quite high, even if it is lower than, for
instance, the correlation between BD and BDUS or between MRO and
MR.
19This data set is available on www.pwt.econ.upenn.edu. The complete reference is:
Heston, A., R. Summers and B. Aten (2002): ”Penn World Table version 6.1”, Center for
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP). For more informa-
tion on the variables, see also Summers and Heston (1991).
23BD BDO BDUS MR MRO MRUS
BD 1.000 0.941 0.942 0.794 0.650 0.640
BDO 1.000 0.990 0.799 0.750 0.725
BDUS 1.000 0.808 0.742 0.741
MR 1.000 0.926 0.930
MRO 1.000 0.969
MRUS 1.000
Table 3: Measures of brain drain and general migration: correlation matrix
The ﬁrst part of our econometric analysis is based on brain drain estimates
taken from the CD data set. The estimation results are presented in Table 4:
the average growth rate of per capita GDP(ygr) is the dependent variable. A
benchmark case without the migration/equality issue is considered to allow
for a comparison with Barro (2000) and de la Croix and Doepke (2003).
The regression equations are all estimated by means of the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM).
In Table 4, looking at Regression (1) (the benchmark case) we can see
that the signs of the coeﬃcients are as expected: the investment/GDP ratio
has a positive eﬀect, while the African dummy and initial GDP (accounting
for convergence) have both negative coeﬃcients. These ﬁndings reproduce
the standard results of the empirical growth literature. In particular, the
estimated coeﬃcient of I/Y is remarkably close to de la Croix and Doepke’s
(2003) estimates.
Regressions (2)-(7) add the brain drain and the cross-term BD ∗ MID
to the benchmark equation, employing diﬀerent measures for MID. In the
majority of cases, the two terms BD and BD ∗ MID (in its diﬀerent decli-
nations) are strongly signiﬁcant and have got the expected sign. Moreover,
the coeﬃcient of BD ∗ MID turns out to be, in absolute value, larger than
the coeﬃcient of BD. This is true for both type of (in)equality measures
(schooling and income).
In general the J-test, that tells us if the residuals are reasonably close to
being orthogonal to the instruments we are using, never rejects the overiden-
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variables (1: benchmark) (2: MIDT) (3: MIDdumT) (4: MIDC) (5: MIDdumC) (6: MIDdumQ) (7: MIDdumG)
constant 12.01* (6.60) 7.71 (6.88) 13.19* (6.96) 9.52 (6.52) 11.04 (6.92) 10.80 (6.81) 12.40* (7.34)
I/Y 0.13** (0.03) 0.13** (0.03) 0.14** (0.03) 0.12** (0.03) 0.16** (0.03) 0.16** (0.04) 0.12** (0.03)
log(y0) -1.46* (0.79) -0.94 (0.83) -1.55* (0.84) -1.16 (0.77) -1.42* (0.85) -1.33 (0.89) -1.38 (0.90)
dumAFR -3.92** (1.10) -3.37** (1.12) -3.92** (1.22) -2.96** (0.99) -3.32** (1.11) -2.52** (1.19) -4.02** (1.42)
BDO -0.09* (0.05) -0.20* (0.11) -0.17** (0.07) -0.05 (0.03) -0.18* (0.10) -0.25** (0.12)
BDO ∗ MID 0.18** (0.08) 0.23** (0.10) 0.37** (0.13) 0.13** (0.05) 0.27** (0.10) 0.32** (0.11)
n. obs. 50 50 50 50 50 35 42
J-test 7.76 3.73 2.78 2.28 4.22 5.80 5.97
χ-sq. 5% 14.07 11.07 11.07 11.07 11.07 11.07 11.07
Notes.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP (ygr). Deﬁnitions of the independent variables are given in the text.
As instruments, we use: constant, log of initial per capita GDP, log of initial per capita GDP squared, initial investment over GDP, Africa dummy,
initial life expectancy (from U.S. Bureau of Census), initial life expectancy squared, total enrollment (in %) in secondary school at year 1985,
percentage of population with no schooling at year 1985, and the tropic and distance variables of Gallup et al. (1999).
The J-test is the one for overidentifying restrictions proposed by Hansen (1982): it asymptotically behaves as a χ2 with n degrees of freedom, and n
(the number of overidentifying restrictions) is given by the diﬀerence between the number of predetermined variables (instruments) and the number
of estimated coeﬃcients.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; ∗∗ and ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10% and at the 5% respectively.
Table 4: GMM estimations (CD)
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5tifying restrictions at the 5% level.
It’s worth saying that, with respect to most of the empirical studies on
growth, we don’t have G/Y among the explanatory variables. This choice
allows us to gain degrees of freedom. However, we performed regression with
G/Y as well, but the substance of the results did not change; nevertheless,
it has to be said G/Y happened to be non-signiﬁcant in a few cases, and
the J-test produced less satisfactory results. We would also underline that
the results reported in Table 4, which are obtained employing data on high-
skilled migration to the whole group of OECD countries (BD ≡ BDO), hold
essentially unchanged if instead we consider data on the brain drain directed
to the U.S. (BD ≡ BDUS)20.
The last remark is about the Africa dummy, which appears with a smaller
coeﬃcient in the speciﬁcation with MIDdumQ. This result is due to the fact
that MIDdumQ is derived from Deininger and Squire’s data on inequality:
since data on the quintile distribution of income are often missing for many
of the poorest African countries, these country are dropped from the sample,
leading to a weaker dummy coeﬃcient.
The second part of our exercise consists in re-estimating our equation for
the same developing countries as before, but using DM data instead of CD
data. This can be seen as a sort of test of robustness, and the estimation
results are presented in Table 5.
We see that the results are fairly stable when compared to the ones pre-
sented in Tables 4. Changing the database has not altered the substance of
our ﬁndings, apart from some gains (like in the equation with MIDC) or
losses (MIDdumQ) in the signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables.
It’s also worth noting that in most cases the cross-term BD MID tends
to be more signiﬁcant than BD, as it was before.
Finally, we have rerun our regression trying to use all the information
contained in Docquier and Marfouk’s data set. Unfortunately, out of 170
countries for which they provide brain drain estimates, only a maximum of 91
20All these complementary estimation results are available upon request.
26Independent Regressions
variables (1: benchmark) (2: MIDT) (3: MIDdumT) (4: MIDC) (5: MIDdumC) (6: MIDdumQ) (7: MIDdumG)
constant 12.01* (6.60) 8.02 (6.78) 12.60* (6.93) 19.06** (9.03) 10.77 (6.69) 2.37 (4.65) 10.86* (6.48)
I/Y 0.13** (0.03) 0.12** (0.03) 0.13** (0.04) 0.12** (0.03) 0.15** (0.03) 0.11** (0.04) 0.12** (0.03)
log(y0) -1.46* (0.79) -0.95 (0.82) -1.44* (0.83) -2.26** (1.07) -1.34 (0.82) -0.20 (0.63) -1.23 (0.80)
dumAFR -3.92** (1.10) -3.36** (1.11) -3.59** (1.21) -4.59** (1.54) -3.21** (1.06) -0.30 (0.91) -3.63** (1.28)
BD -0.08* (0.04) -0.13* (0.07) -0.10** (0.05) -0.06* (0.03) -0.16* (0.08) -0.17* (0.09)
BD ∗ MID 0.14** (0.06) 0.15** (0.06) 0.21** (0.08) 0.11** (0.05) 0.19** (0.07) 0.24** (0.08)
n. obs. 50 50 50 50 50 35 42
J-test 7.76 3.59 3.07 1.69 4.34 7.03 6.27
χ-sq. 5% 14.07 11.07 11.07 11.07 11.07 11.07 11.07
Notes.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP (ygr). Deﬁnitions of the independent variables are given in the text.
As instruments, we use: constant, log of initial per capita GDP, log of initial per capita GDP squared, initial investment over GDP, Africa dummy,
initial life expectancy (from U.S. Bureau of Census), initial life expectancy squared, total enrollment (in %) in secondary school at year 1985,
percentage of population with no schooling at year 1985, and the tropic and distance variables of Gallup et al. (1999).
The J-test is the one for overidentifying restrictions proposed by Hansen (1982): it asymptotically behaves as a χ2 with n degrees of freedom, and n
(the number of overidentifying restrictions) is given by the diﬀerence between the number of predetermined variables (instruments) and the number
of estimated coeﬃcients.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; ∗∗ and ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10% and at the 5% respectively.
Table 5: GMM estimations (DM, developing countries)
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7have simultaneously available data for the other variables we need (with data
on inequality representing the most severe limitation). Then, our sample is
less than doubled, from 50 to 91 countries. However, it is interesting to verify
how the inclusion of OECD countries in the sample, and thus the explicit
consideration of a North-North brain drain, modiﬁes the picture. Table 6
presents the estimation output.
Two things arise quite clearly. First, the quality of the growth regres-
sion improves a lot: all the standard explanatory variables are now always
strongly signiﬁcant (with the usual exception of the Africa dummy, when a
number of African countries is dropped out of the sample). Second: while
the interactive term BD   MID continues to be signiﬁcant and to appear
with the expected sign, the BD term, i.e. the brain drain per se loses its
signiﬁcance in most cases. Technically, this comes as a consequence of the
introduction of industrialized countries in the sample. The intuition behind
this fact could be that, apart from the incentive eﬀect that still holds for de-
veloped economies, in those countries the brain drain in itself is less harmful,
maybe because of the easier replacement of high skilled workers.
The same remark we made about public expenditure when commenting
Table 3 applies. In fact, both the results in Table 4 and 5 would not have un-
dergone any signiﬁcant change after including G/Y in the set of independent
variables.
To sum up our empirical ﬁndings, we would say that our econometric
work conﬁrms that the relation between brain drain and growth is highly
non-linear, with this non-linearity being possibly linked to some inequality
(or middle class size) measure. As it was suggested by our model, only
the presence of a fairly numerous middle class can make really eﬀective (in
terms of overall growth) the incentive eﬀect induced by an increased migra-
tion chance, thus possibly encouraging developing countries to set up quite
”permissive” emigration policies.
Moreover, these results are quite robust to the change of the database
(from CD to DM) if the estimations are limited to a cross-section of develop-
28Independent Regressions
variables (1: benchmark) (2: MIDT) (3: MIDdumT) (4: MIDC) (5: MIDdumC) (6: MIDdumQ) (7: MIDdumG)
constant 6.59** (2.40) 8.62** (2.58) 8.73** (2.76) 9.63** (2.69) 8.52** (2.22) 8.17** (3.40) 9.30** (3.54)
I/Y 0.15** (0.03) 0.15** (0.04) 0.14** (0.04) 0.16** (0.04) 0.19** (0.04) 0.10** (0.05) 0.13** (0.05)
log(y0) -0.83** (0.30) -1.07** (0.35) -1.02** (0.36) -1.19** (0.36) -1.16** (0.31) -0.83* (0.45) -1.02** (0.45)
dumAFR -2.77** (0.75) -3.14** (0.82) -2.65** (0.89) -2.94** (0.79) -2.90** (0.75) -0.45 (0.87) -2.03* (1.05)
BD -0.05 (0.05) -0.10 (0.08) -0.06 (0.05) -0.03 (0.04) -0.24** (0.10) -0.23 (0.15)
BD ∗ MID 0.11** (0.05) 0.12* (0.07) 0.12** (0.05) 0.13** (0.04) 0.23** (0.10) 0.28** (0.14)
n. obs. 91 91 91 91 91 70 77
J-test 10.60 5.41 5.64 2.83 4.05 5.17 5.79
χ-sq. 5% 14.07 11.07 11.07 11.07 11.07 11.07 11.07
Notes.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP (ygr). Deﬁnitions of the independent variables are given in the text.
As instruments, we use: constant, log of initial per capita GDP, log of initial per capita GDP squared, initial investment over GDP, Africa dummy,
initial life expectancy (from U.S. Bureau of Census), initial life expectancy squared, total enrollment (in %) in secondary school at year 1985,
percentage of population with no schooling at year 1985, and the tropic and distance variables of Gallup et al. (1999).
The J-test is the one for overidentifying restrictions proposed by Hansen (1982): it asymptotically behaves as a χ2 with n degrees of freedom, and n
(the number of overidentifying restrictions) is given by the diﬀerence between the number of predetermined variables (instruments) and the number
of estimated coeﬃcients.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; ∗∗ and ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10% and at the 5% respectively.
Table 6: GMM estimations (DM, full sample)
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9ing countries. On the contrary, the inclusion of industrialized countries in the
sample, while conﬁrming the incentive eﬀect argument, makes less clear the
negative eﬀect that the brain drain ”per se” should exert on overall growth.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed an OLG model of human capital led growth,
to show that allowing for emigration of the highest skilled individuals from
a developing country is likely to encourage human capital formation (thus
fostering domestic growth in the short run), only if human capital is quite
equally distributed, i.e. if there exists a numerous enough ”middle class”
waiting for educational opportunities. However, in a long run perspective
this incentive gets dispersed (in the sense that it will touch a progressively
shrinking portion of the population), while the human capital ﬂight lasts
forever, depressing average income.
Our ”short run” claim could be straightly translated into an economet-
rically testable equation: as a consequence, we have been able to perform
some growth regressions using available data on production, inequality and
high-skilled migration. Estimation outputs turned out to be in line with our
theoretical ﬁndings, both when schooling and income inequality have been
considered. These results have shown remarkable robustness both to the
change in the dataset for a cross-section of developing countries and to the
inclusion of developed countries in the sample.
Moreover, we have also proposed a deeper interpretation of our main
result: in fact it entrains the claim that in a given backward economy, in-
equality is harmful to growth, when it is seen in a perspective of progressive
opening of the frontiers. In other words our model would suggests that, as
skilled workers become more and more mobile, a new channel through which
more inequality may translate into slower growth for developing countries
begins to operate and should deserve consideration.
To conclude, we would underline that our model could be extended at
30least along one direction. In fact, we did not consider the issue of social
mobility (from one class to another), that is likely to be quite important in
qualifying the dynamic relationship between inequality and growth.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Step 0.












= (1 − τt)δh
δ−1








which is positive for every ht.
Step 1.
Let’s consider τ1 < τ2;
then: ∃ht = h1,2 : Ω(τ1) = Ω(τ2)












Similarly, there do exist h2,3 and h1,3 as deﬁned in Proposition 1.
Step 2.
We claim that, for appropriate values of the parameters ,
Ω(τj) > (<)Ω(τi) for h > (<)hi,j
where i,j = 1,2,3 and i < j.
In other words we want to show that the lifetime income curve associated with
higher education crosses from below the one with lower schooling, meaning
that higher education will be more convenient for relatively higher values of
parental human capital.































34As it is, (16) is not a simple condition on the parameters, since it involves
ht, an endogenous variable of our model. But, since it poses a lower bound














τ3 > τ2 ⇒ h2,3 > h1,2,










































The latter holds when the slope of τσ is less than 1, which means for all the
values of τ implied by (18).
Step 4.
To complete our proof, we now simply need to prove that h1,2 < h1,3 < h2,3,
i.e. that the crossing point between Ω(τ1) and Ω(τ3) lies between the other
two.
Why should it be true?
It is true because both the inequalities h1,3 > h2,3 and h1,2 < h1,3 are veriﬁed
for the same values of (τ,σ) which validate Step 3.
35Then, h1,2 < h1,3 < h2,3 necessarily holds, when also 1 > στσ−1 holds; that
means for all those values of τ such that the slope of the function τσ is less
than 1.















We can try to provide some economic intuitions about the above inequality.
In fact, we can see that the ﬁrst part of the inequality becomes less and less
binding as σ decreases; this means when parental skill is not so important in
the reproduction of human capital (i.e., when time spent in school is much
more important than parents), even with a very low starting level of τ1. A
possible deeper meaning, however, is not trivial and is not easy to ﬁnd. In
fact Step 3 tells us simply that, given τ3 > τ2, the individual who is indiﬀer-
ent between τ2 and τ3 has more parental human capital than the one who is
indiﬀerent between τ1 and τ3.
On the other hand, the second part of inequality (19), when satisﬁed, en-
sures that higher education is relatively more attractive for higher values of
parental human capital (the crossing-from-below property of our curves). It
becomes less and less binding (at the limit it is not a restriction any more)
as human capital increases, and as the returns of education increase, while
the eﬀect of σ is ambiguous. In fact we can rewrite (19) as:
σ
1













Ceteris paribus, with too high values of ”oﬀered” τ’s, the latter may not hold,
and we would have a crossing-from-above situation, since in this case the
weight of parental human capital is somewhat ”minimized” (when compared
with the large amount of schooling time employed in the production of new
human capital), and thus education becomes relatively more attractive for
the less skilled.
36B Proof of Proposition 2
Recalling that we are dealing with the case with two possible educational



































Since we are in a short-run perspective, we can simplify assuming that
γ = 1.
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The limit for m → 1 is always negative, while the limit for → 0 is always
positive if hA
1,2 >   h. The claim of Proposition 2 is thus established.
C Proof of Proposition 3
To prove Proposition 3 we need to focus on the two factors composing the
numerator of the expression for gM
t , since the denominator does not depend


























It is easy to see that ∂B
∂m is always positive. Therefore, if A gets a maximum
for 0 < m ≤ 1, the same can be said about gM
t as a whole.
We need the following inequalities to hold simultaneously:
limm→0
∂A
∂m > 0 and limm→1
∂A
∂m < 0.























and its positiveness is granted for:












































is negative provided that:


































To conclude, let’s underline that a suﬃcient condition for
38 
2wF
























to be positive, is simply that:
wF
t+1
wt+1
> 2
 τ1
τ2
 σ
.
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